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By: Kelebogile Zvobgo, Megan Shannon, Cody D Eldredge

Abstract:

Autocracies, like democracies, use reservations to adjust their treaty commitments. But autocracies receive far greater pressure to withdraw reservations. To what extent is this pressure effective? We show through statistical analyses and case illustrations that autocracies respond to international pressure differently than democracies. Autocracies are more likely to withdraw reservations when facing treaty body reviews and less likely to withdraw reservations in response to peer state objections. We propose explanations for this difference. Autocracies may be more responsive to periodic reviews because they are conducted by technical experts from diverse countries, regions, and political regimes, rather than by states’ political representatives. Periodic review is an iterative process that gives autocracies time to address domestic opposition to withdrawing reservations. Yet, autocracies may be less likely to withdraw reservations in response to state objections because they see objections, which primarily originate with Western democracies, as biased, hypocritical, and possibly even neocolonial. Objections are also only filed once and may not have the sustained impact necessary to prompt reservation withdrawal. Our research improves scholarly understanding of autocratic states’ engagement with international law and international organizations, and reveals the conditional effects of the international community efforts to change state behavior within treaty regimes.

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